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NOTE
The Road to Retirement-Paved with Good Intentions
but Dotted with Potholes of Untold Liability: Erisa
Section 510, Mixed Motives and Title VII
Christina A Smith*
In January 1996, AT&T announced that it would eliminate
40,000 jobs, its largest single job cut ever,1 in an effort to in-
crease competitiveness and profitability. AT&T is one of sev-
eral companies 2 contributing to the increase in the elimination
of corporate jobs in recent years.3 Labor Department statistics
show the elimination of more than 36 million jobs from 1979
through 1993. The New York Times estimates the number of
jobs eliminated through 1995 to be 43 million.5
Employers who eliminate jobs to insure corporate com-
petitiveness and continued profitability in a global market may
find themselves confronted with the threat of extensive liabil-
ity lurking in the shadows of a pension promise they made to
their employees in brighter days. As companies continue to
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1994,
Hamline University.
1 AT&T to Eliminate 40,000 Jobs, STAR TRIB., Jan. 3, 1996, at D1.
2. See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, As Work Is Redefined, Millions
Become Casualties: Replacing Lost Job Is Often a Downer, STAR TRIB., Mar.
10, 1996, at A19, A20 (listing fifteen companies who have announced the
elimination of the most jobs in the past four years).
3. Id. at A20. The article found that
At the same time some layoffs seem rooted in economic fashion. An
unforgiving Wall Street has given its signals of approval-rising
stock prices-to companies that take the meat-ax to their costs. The
day Sears announced it was discarding 50,000 jobs, its stock climbed
nearly 4 percent. The day Xerox said it would prune 10,000 jobs, its
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merge6 and "downsize,"7 cases involving employee benefits' in-
creasingly find their way into the courtroom.9 Much of the
6. See Don L. Boroughs, Big! Heightened Global Competition, Innovative
Technology and Washington's Friendly Regulatory Climate Have Unleashed a
New Tidal Wave of Corporate Mergers in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 46 (discussing the difference between meirgers in the 1980s
and those occurring in the 1990s, and stating that "1995 is on its way to be-
coming the biggest year for mergers and acquisitions in history").
According to one merger consultant, since the beginning of 1995 more
than $270 billion worth of mergers and takeovers have been announced, sig-
nalling the start of a merger wave that may dwarf the merger mania of the
1980s: "As your competitors get bigger, you're almost forced to get bigger to
stay equal," says Norman C. Selby, head of McKinsey & Co's pharmaceutical
practice. "It's a continual game of catch-up." Michael Mandel, Land of the Gi-
ants, BUS. WK., Sept. 11, 1995, at 34; see also Deirdre McMurdy, Merger
Meltdown: With All the Recent Mega-deals, There Is a New Chill Creeping into
the Business Sector, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 4, 1995, at 35 (discussing the different
attitude of Canadian mergers); Gerald F. Seib, Is Big Bad? The Disgruntled
Say That It Is, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1995, at A20 (discussing the "spate of
summertime mergers").
7. The term "downsize" has recent origins. It "didn't even enter the lan-
guage until the early 1970s, when it was coined by the auto industry to refer
to the shrinking of cars. Starting in 1982, it was applied to humans and en-
tered in the college edition of the American Heritage Dictionary." Louis
Uchitell and N.R. Kleinfield, As Work Is Redefined, Millions Become Casual-
ties: Replacing Lost Job Is Often a Downer, STAR TRIB., Mar. 10, 1996, at A19,
A20; see also PAUL F. GERHART, SAVING PLANTS AND JOBS 33-69, 106 (1987)
(examining union strategy to avoid a plant closing situation and advocating
advanced warning of a plant shut down); MARIE HOWLAND, PLANT CLOSINGS
AND WORKER DISPLACEMENT: THE REGIONAL ISSUES 156, 157 (1988)
(reporting on an empirical study advocating advanced warning to workers and
communities of plant closings); WEYMAN T. JOHNSON, JR. & DEBORAH A.
SUDBURY, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE WARN "PLANT CLOSING" LAW, at i (1989)
(citing widespread plant closings and layoffs); JOHN PORTZ, THE POLITICS OF
PLANT CLOSINGS 3-5 (1990) (discussing local response to plant closings);
LAWRENCE E. ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLITICS, AND WORKERS
167-70 (1986) (discussing reasons for plant closings); Paul I. Weiner, Involun-
tary Reductions in Force: A Step by Step Approach, in REDUCTIONS IN
WORKFORCE AND BENEFITS IN A SHRINKING ECONOMY 17 (PLI ed., 1991)
(finding that during the 1980s an unprecedented number of reductions in
force (RIFs) occurred and that these RIFs will continue to occur as U.S. busi-
nesses become more integrated with the international markets); AT&T to
Eliminate 40,000 Jobs, STAR TRIB., Jan. 3, 1996, at D1, D2 (stating that "[tiop
executives expressed anguish about the cuts but said competition and new
technology made it necessary"); G. Pascal Zachary, Layoff Announcements In.
creased 39% in August as Merger Activity Picked Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
1995, at A2.
8. For a discussion of two types of employee benefit plans--defined con-
tribution plans and defined benefit plans-see infra notes 43 & 174.
9. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 17. Weiner discusses the impact of re-
duction-in-force termination litigation. He states that "[s]ome of these claims
ERISA SECTION 510
growth in litigation involves claims based on the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).'0 The appli-
cability of ERISA to cases involving plant closings" is deter-
mined under Section 51012 of ERISA, which Congress enacted
to protect employee benefit plans.
Section 510 cases brought against companies by former
employees who were terminated in a plant closing currently
face uneven adjudication, due largely to the judicial application
of a Title VII analysis to such cases.13 Title VII provides courts
with a proof mechanism to use when examining cases that in-
volve mixed motives. 4 Many of these plant closing cases in-
volve management decisions in which pension benefits "played
have become class actions involving hundreds of terminated employees, and in
some cases have resulted in judgments amounting to millions of dollars." Id.
10. Charles S. Mishkind & Akusin B. Marshall, A Management Perspec-
tive on Reductions in Force: ADEA, ERISA and Related Litigation, 723
PLI/CoRP 287, 359 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series, Jan.-
Feb. 1991). The authors write: "Employee benefit litigation is on the rise.
This phenomenon can be traced to a heightened awareness by plaintiffs and
counsel of the rights and causes of action created by and available under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act." Id.
11. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)
defines the term "plant closing" as:
[T]he permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employ-
ment, or one or more facilities or operating units within a single site
of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the
single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more
employees excluding any part-time employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) (1994).
12. ERISA § 510 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for ex-
ercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan, this title, section 3001 [29 U.S.C.S. § 1201), or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such partici-
pant may become entitled under the plan, this title or the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person
because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify
in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1985) [hereinafter § 510]. This Note addresses plant clos-
ings in the context of the "non-interference provision" of § 510, the third
clause of the statute.
13. For two cases with similar fact patterns and opposite results, compare
Unida v. Levi Strauss, 986 F.2d 970, 981 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no employer
liability), with Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1550 (C.D. Utah
1992) (holding employer liable).
14. For a discussion of judicial application of Title VII proof models to
cases involving mixed motives, see infra Part I.D.
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a part" in the final decision to close the plant.15 The term
"played a part" refers to a decision that was motivated in part
by pension benefits. Such a decision can also be referred to as
a decision which is based upon "mixed motives." Without an
equitable judicial examination of all the factors that lead to
plant closing decisions, companies that maintain pension
plans16 and decide to close plants open themselves to extensive
litigation and massive amounts of potential damages.'" Be-
cause Title VII claims also involve a mixed motive analysis, 8
courts examining mixed motive plant closing decisions have
looked to employment discrimination law for judicial guidance.
As the judicial interpretation of Title VII changes within
the employment context, it is unclear whether the judicial in-
terpretation of Title VII in § 510 cases will reflect these
changes. 9 This uncertainty creates an uneasiness for both the
potential employee plaintiff and the potential corporate defen-
dant. The employee plaintiff does not want to further jeopard-
ize his or her financial situation through entry in a futile law-
suit, while the corporate defendant fears that the use of
pension benefits in any cost-benefit analysis could portend ex-
tensive liability.2"
15. See infra Part I.D (discussing mixed motive plant closing cases).
16. Pension plans and plan assets have grown dramatically since the en-
actment of ERISA. See IZZET SAHIN, PRIVATE PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE
MOBILITY 18 (1989). Sahin writes that "[b]etween 1975 and 1987 the total
number of pension plans has more than doubled and assets have grown from
$290 billion to $1.5 trillion." Id.
17. One case involved 1,892 plaintiffs. Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F.
Supp. 1501, 1570 (C.D. Utah 1992). The court found that "the amount and
kind of relief to which each prevailing individual plaintiff is entitled will be
determined on an individual basis in subsequent proceedings." Id. at 1571.
18. See infra Part I.D (discussing employment discrimination law).
19. For an analysis of Title VII changes see infra notes 115-118 and ac-
companying text.
20. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAw 127 (2d ed. 1995). The authors discuss the employers decision
making process:
Do you think that employers make plant closure or other large scale
layoff decisions in ignorance of fringe benefit costs?... Do you think
good managers make such decisions ignorant of such fundamentally
relevant information?... Does the risk of such liability promote or




This Note argues that courts' analyses of § 510 claims
should vary under different factual scenarios.21 Courts' current
mechanical application of Title VII proof models invariably
leads to inequitable results. This Note addresses current judi-
cial issues arising under the "non-interference" provision of §
510. Part I of this Note examines the text, legislative intent
and purpose of § 51022 as well as the application of Title VIP3
judicial models to § 510 mixed motive plant closing cases. Part
II provides a critique of judicial approaches to § 510 cases.
This Note concludes that the flexible application of an equita-
ble, Title VIT-like proof standard24 to mixed motive plant clos-
ings would insure that § 510's purpose is fulfilled, without re-
quiring employers to "mold" plant closing justifications to
satisfy court-imposed "acceptable" motivations. 5
21 See Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1241 (8th
Cir. 1991). The court found that "[allthough the four criteria set forth in
McDonnell Douglas provide one way of establishing a prima facie case of em-
ployment discrimination, the proof necessary will vary according to the cir-
cumstances of the case." (citations omitted). Id. at 1242. The McDonnell
Douglas test, discussed infra notes 107-111, is used by courts in cases involv-
ing circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination under Title VII and
also in cases arising under § 510. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-04 (1973) (adopting a proof model for circumstantial evidence-based
Title VII claims); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.
1987) (adopting the McDonnell Douglas test for § 510 cases).
22. This section follows the form of analysis suggested by William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey in Statutory Interpretation As Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353 (1990).
23. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
24. The implementation of a flexible, purpose-based standard would con-
sider such factors as the actual purpose of the plant closing and the amount of
weight accorded to pension benefits in the plant closing decision. The stan-
dard would insure that those affected by plant closings (both employees and
employers) understand fully their rights under ERISA. The flexible purpose-
based standard advocated in this Note would involve a continued application
of current Supreme Court Title VII analysis in cases involving circumstantial
evidence of intent and an application of pre-1991 Supreme Court Title VII
analysis in cases involving direct evidence of intent. For a further discussion
of Supreme Court Title VII decisions see infra Part I.D.
25. See Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major
Claims and Defenses, C996 ALI-ABA 1, 93 (Jan. 26, 1995). Cummings writes:
Surely there is precious little comfort in knowing that every
"competent management" should "consider" the estimated employee
benefit cost saving in a particular layoff, but that the cost saving
should not be the "prime catalyst." In other words: think about it,
but don't think exclusively or primarily about it. That appears to be
an invitation to create less-then-accurate paper trails. But the stat-
ute itself provides no completely safe guideline.
7391997]
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I. ERISA, SECTION 510 AND TITLE VII IN
MIXED MOTIVE PLANT CLOSINGS
ERISA and Title VII appear to peacefully coexist within §
510 judicial decisions. This coexistence is premised upon
similarities between the text, intent and purpose of ERISA and
Title VII2 6
A. ERIsA's ENACTMENT AND SECTION 510'S TEXT, INTENT AND
PURPOSE
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, many abuses existed
within private pension plans." These abuses and problems
adversely affected both union and non-union employees alike. 8
Enacted to eliminate such abuses, ERISA protects private
Id.; see also Peter M. Panken, et al., Discriminatory Discharge Under ERISA
Section 510, Q206 ALI-ABA 49, 59 (May 16, 1991). Panken recommends a
course for those contemplating a reduction in force. He writes:
In planning a reduction in force, employers are well advised to choose
terminees on some basis other than their benefit entitlement under
ERISA plans. It is best not to calculate what is due until afer termi-
nation selections are made, but it is wise to check whether the selec-
tions have an adverse effect on those about to vest before finalizing
the list to be sure that the selection reasons will withstand attack.
Id.
26. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between Title VII
and § 510 see infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
27. See Michael Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S.
SENATE, SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25, Information Paper, reprinted
in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at 67-68. Gordon writes:
The Senate committee investigations found that the extremely rapid
growth of private pension plans had led to all manner of abuses, rang-
ing from ineptness and lack of know-how to outright looting of benefit
funds and corrupt administration. In addition to embezzlements, kick-
backs, unjustifiably high administrative costs, and excessive invest-
ment of funds in employer securities, serious examples of improper in-
surance practices were also found, including exorbitantly high
commission and administrative charges, fictitious fees, retention by
some insurance carriers of an unduly large share of the premiums...
and collusion between insurance representatives, union officials and
management.
Id.
28. Id. (discussing collusion between insurance representatives and union
agents). The union bargaining contract has remained a sounding block for
those who find rationality in such agreements and argue that the risk should
be born by the contracting parties. Robert Royes, an AT&T pension plan offi-
cial, argues that the parties to such an agreement should bear the risk of loss.
He asks: "Should the parties who assume the risk of establishing a pension
plan with large unfunded liabilities expect others to bail them out if things go
wrong?" LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at 66.
ERISA SECTION 510
pension benefits.29 One of the primary impetuses for the gov-
ernment regulation of pension benefits embodied in ERISA
was the 1963 closing of a Studebaker automobile plant.3" The
Studebaker plant closing involved a pension plan termination
affecting 11,000 autoworkers. 1 The termination agreement
reached between Studebaker and the United Automobile
Workers (UAW) divided pension plan participants into three
priority groups.32 Members of the first priority group received
29. ERISA § 2(b). "It is hereby declared to be in the policy of this Act to
protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries ... "
30. Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influences on the Pri-
vate Pension Plan Reform Movement, in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at
62. "The closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana,
in December of 1963 is widely regarded as a pivotal event in the history of the
movement toward comprehensive federal regulation of private pension plans."
Id. Prior to the enactment of ERISA much of the regulation of pensions was
left to the private employer. Id. The private employer-regulated pension plan
model was based on a belief that private employers owed a "moral duty" to
employees to insure that they were duly compensated in old age. Id. In 1949,
a presidential fact-finding commission report stated:
We think all industry in the absence of adequate Government pro-
grams, owes an obligation to workers to provide for maintenance of
the human body in the form of medical and similar benefits and full
depreciation in the form of old age retirement-in the same way as it
now does for plant and machinery.
H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
The closing of the Studebaker plant may have provided one reason for the
change in government policy toward the regulation of pension benefits, but
another reason is the growth of pension coverage. Id.
In 1940, an estimated four million employees were covered by private
pension plans; in 1950, the figure had increased to almost 10 million
and in 1960 over 21 million were covered. Currently, [circa 1974]
over 30 million employees or almost one half of the private non-farm
work force are covered by these plans.... Today, in excess of $150
billion in assets are held in reserve to pay benefits credited to private
plan participants. This rapid growth has constituted the basis for
legislative efforts at both the federal and state levels to assure equi-
table and fair administration of all pension plans.
Id.
31. Allen, supra note 30, at 62.
32. Id. at 63.
The agreement [between the company and the United Automobile
Workers (UAW)] divided the plan participants into three groups: (1)
3,600 retirees and active workers who had already reached the per-
mitted retirement age of 60; (2) approximately 4,000 employees, aged
40 to 59, who had at least ten years of service with the company and
whose pension benefits had therefore vested; and (3) a residual group
of 2,900 workers who had no vested rights.
Id. A "vested pension" right exists "when an employee (or his or her estate)
has rights to all the benefits purchased with the employer's contributions to
1997] 741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
lifetime annuities.33 After the purchase of these annuities, the
funds remaining did not cover the vested claims of the employ-
ees in the second priority group.34 Workers falling into the
third priority group, those with nonvested pension rights, re-
ceived nothing." This plan termination resulted in approxi-
mately 4,400 workers losing a portion or all of their vested
pension rights.36
Explicitly noting the impact of the Studebaker incident,7
Congress passed ERISA with the intent of protecting "those
benefits that an employer voluntarily agrees to provide"38 and
"those benefits an employee has earned through working."39
ERISA attempted to correct the deficiencies found in existing
pension plans and insure that workers would ultimately enjoy
their earned benefits. °
the plan even if the employee is not employed by this employer at the time of
retirement." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1563 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See Allen, supra note 30, at 62-63.
34. Id. "These workers [those in the second group] received lump-sum
payments equal to about 15 percent of the actuarial value of their accrued
pension benefits." Id.
35. Id.
36. Gordon, supra note 27, at 70.
37. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4680. "Concern has also been expressed over the possible loss of pension
benefits as a result of termination of pension plans. The Studebaker case,
which has been widely publicized, illustrates how pension benefits can be lost
as a result of termination of a plan." Id.
38. Charles S. Mishkind, Protected Rights Under Section 510 of ERISA:
Avoiding "Something For Nothing," C583 ALI-ABA 425, 429 (February 21,
1991). For one judicial interpretation of the purpose of ERISA see Nemeth v.
Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 905 (W.D. Mich. 1987). "Allowing an em-
ployer to defend an ERISA claim solely on the ground that its pension pro-
gram was too expensive to maintain would defeat the purpose of § 510, which
is to prohibit employers from making employment decisions based upon pen-
sion costs." Id.
39. Mishkind, supra note 38, at 429. "ERISA is not and was not intended
to be a 'guaranteed employment' statute.... [Clourts have recognized that
ERISA is a 'sweat equity' statute and not, in effect a guarantee-of-employment
act." Id.; see also Peter M. Panken, et al., Discriminatory Discharge Under
ERISA Section 510, Q206 ALI-ABA 49, 53 (May 16, 1991) ("The difficulty in a
literal reading of § 510 is that it could make it unlawful to discharge anyone.
After all, any termination prevents the terminated individual from accruing
further benefits .. ").
40. Senator Domenici commented on the pension protections offered to
workers through ERISA:
This measure is designed to eliminate the deficiencies which our
study identified in the existing private pension system. Its basic goal
is to assure workers that they will receive the promised pension
benefits earned for their retirement during their working lives. It
also responds to the proven need for a comprehensive and meaningful
[Vol. 81:735742
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Section 510 provides the statutory basis for employee
claims against companies involved in plant closings.41 Section
510's language permits an employee to bring suit against an
employer who interfered with the "attainment of any right"
under the employee's pension plan.42 Termination is the ulti-
mate form of interference affecting both vested and nonvested
employees; the vested employee can no longer accrue pension
benefits,4 3 and the nonvested employee loses the opportunity to
become vested in the first place.
Under a strictly textual approach to § 510, the plaintiff
employees alleging that plant closings interfered with their
pension benefits' should generally prevail.4 5 This result is due
to the absolutist language that formulates the employer's duty
to the employee. Section 510 also describes the plaintiff class
in expansive terms.46 Consequently, under a strict reading of
reform of our private pension system. It proposes fair, feasible, and
effective regulatory measures which will fulfill the fundamental pur-
poses of a pension.
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SEcuRiTYACT OF 1974, at 1830 (Comm. Print 1976) (remarks of Sena-
tor Domenici).
41. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994). For the complete text of Sec-
tion 510 see supra note 12.
42. ERISA § 510.
43. This example assumes a defined benefit pension plan. Such a plan
involves a set period of time during which an employee becomes "vested" in
the plan and therefore entitled to the employer contributions made to the
plan. The allocation of benefits from a defined benefit plan are made subject
to a set mathematical formula that takes into account years of service, age,
final salary, and a plan-mandated percentage to formulate an employee's
pension benefit.
44. See infra note 140 (discussing courts' unwillingness to apply a textual
analysis to § 510).
45. Section 510 states: "It shall be unlawful... for any person.., to dis-
criminate against a participant... for exercising any right to which he is en-
titled... or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right...."
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the use of such man-
datory language in the context of statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 642 (2d ed. 1995). For dis-
cussion of the term "may become entitled," see Bass v. Retirement Plan of
Conoco, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 735, 746 (W.D. La. 1988). For a contrary interpre-
tation, see Zipf v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 799 F.2d 889, 893
(3rd Cir. 1986).
46. Section 510 enlarges the potential plaintiff class. It provides causes of
action for both the class of individuals who are entitled to benefits "under the
provisions of an employee benefit plan" and the class of individuals who "may
become entitled under the plan." See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 45, at
1997]
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the statute, an employer defendant can be held liable to a sur-
prisingly large number of former employees.
Section 510's intent and purpose also indicate broad pro-
tection for employees. Congress passed § 510 intending to pro-
vide a mechanism to "deal with Benefit Plan motivated termi-
nations."47 The paradigm case under § 510 exists when an
employee claims that he or she was terminated to save pension
costs. 48 For example, a plaintiff who was fired shortly before
she was to vest49 in her pension benefits could bring a success-
ful § 510 claim. 0 In cases like this, § 510 also fulfills the
broader congressional purpose of protecting employees from
unscrupulous employers.5
641 (stating that "[tierms connected by the disjunctive 'or' are often read to
have separate meanings and significance").
47. See Peter M. Panken, et al., Reductions in Workforce: Legal Rights
and Remedies in Downsizing, Discriminatory Discharge Under ERISA Section
510, Q206 ALI-ABA 49, 52 (May 16, 1991). Panken writes: "Every termina-
tion means plaintiff stops accruing fringe benefits and credit for additional
pension plan benefits. Yet the statute was clearly not passed to add another
cause of action to every termination suit." Id.
48. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at 126.
49. ERISA § 203 provides an explanation of vesting requirements that all
ERISA regulated plans must meet. This section deals with the nonforfeitable
percentage of employer contributions to the plans. ERISA § 203(a)(1) pro-
vides that "an employee's rights in his accrued benefit derived from his own
contributions are nonforfeitable." Thus, this section perpetuates the dichot-
omy between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans, see
infra notes 43 & 174. If the plan meets one of two vesting schedules it will
satisfy the ERISA-mandated vesting schedule. Section 203(a)(2)(A) describes
a "five-year cliff" vesting schedule. A five-year cliff is a vesting schedule in
which "an employee who has completed at least five years of service has a
nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee's accrued benefit derived
from employer contributions." ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A). The second possible
vesting schedule is a seven-year graduated schedule. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B).
Section 203(a)(2)(B) provides a table enumerating the years of service and the
nonforfeitable percentage for those years of service. Under the seven-year
graduated vesting schedule, at three years of service the percentage of nonfor-
feitable benefit is 20%. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B). As each year of service in-
creases, the percentage of nonforfeitable benefits increases by 20% until at the
seven-year point the employee is 100% vested. Id.
50. See Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278,
280 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the jury could find that the firing of an em-
ployee ten months before her pension vested was a pretext to avoid paying
pension costs).
51. See West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that the
legislative history shows that "prohibitions were aimed primarily at prevent-
ing unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their employees in
order to keep them from obtaining vested pension rights"). Senator Hartke
further identified those employees § 510 covered:
[Vol. 81:735
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B. THE PARADIGM SECTION 510 CASE INVOLVING INTENT, TEXT,
PURPOSE, DIRECT EVIDENCE AND ADJUDICATION
The scenario in McLendon v. Continental Can Co. 52 is an
appropriate example of what Congress intended § 510 to com-
bat. Continental Can Company entered into an agreement
with the United Steelworkers of America to establish two pen-
sion plans. 3 Continental realized that these plans created
"substantial, unfunded, pension liabilities" 54 at a time when
the market for their product was shrinking.5 5 As a means of
avoiding these unfunded liabilities, Continental instituted a
"liability avoidance program"56 (LAP) that laid off workers ap-
proaching eligibility for pension benefits.
57
Continental instituted its LAP, also known as a BELL sys-
tem,58 at its St. Louis plant to offset "[diwindling profits from
declining business volume."59 From 1976 to the end of 1980,
Continental gradually reduced its St. Louis work force from
550 to 237.60 John Middleton,6" laid off in 1980 from the St.
Most collective bargaining agreements protect employees against dis-
charge without good cause and provide. effective enforcement ma-
chinery and arbitration proceedings.... But roughly one half of all
pension participants are not unionized so they lack such protection.
Especially vulnerable are managers and executives whose substantial
pension potentialities provide an incentive to their discharge before
vesting... Discipline and discrimination can be so unpleasant as to
amount to constructive discharge .... That can be the type of har-
assment which does not say that one is fired, but makes living such a
hell that a persons wishes he did not have to hang on and endure.
Mishkind, supra note 38, at 431 (citing SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at
1774-75 (Comm. Print 1976) (comments made by Senator Hartke during floor
debate of § 510)).
52. 908 F.2d 1171, 1174 (3d Cir. 1990).




57. "The LAP was executed by a computer tracking system which identi-
fied workers at a particular plant according to their age and years of service.
It operated nationwide." Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d at 1175.
58. The district court found that BELL is a reverse acronym for "Let's
Limit Employee Benefits" or "Lowest Level of Employee Benefits." Id. at 1175
n.4.
59. Id. at 1175-76.
60. Id. at 1176.
61. GORDON L. CLARK, PENSIONS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 49 (1993) (citing Laid-off Workers Tell Hardships
Caused by Continental's Illegal Scheme, STEELABOR, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 8).
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Louis plant, illustrates the actual human cost of a LAP's im-
plementation. Middleton found it impossible to find another
job after his layoff because other employers, aware of his layoff
status, expected Continental to call him back to work.62 Mid-
dleton's loss of employment ultimately led to his qualification
for public assistance.63  The pension promise entered into by
Continental Can and the United Steelworkers of America pro-
vided a seemingly clear numerical rationale for the displace-
ment of workers like Middleton without considering the toll of
its implementation upon its workers' livesr
4
Continental Can's use and development of a LAP, accord-
ing to the court, provided ample evidence of an ERISA § 510
violation.6  The evidence surrounding the LAP provided a
"smoking gun"66 denoting intentional interference with em-
ployee pension benefits.67
C. AN EXAMINATION OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF
SECTION 510 TO MIXED MOTIVE PLANT CLOSINGS
Current § 510 adjudication becomes especially problematic
within the context of plant closings. 6  A strict reading of § 510
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Middleton stated, "I think it was a rotten thing for the company to do.
I was ready to devote my life to them, and I would have if they would have
done the right thing. But they just decided to do us dirty and we found it out
too late." Id.
Pat Bolinger's husband worked for Continental Can and developed cancer
after his layoff:
[His layoff] meant the loss of his health insurance or the disability
pension he might have received. By the time of his death in 1987, his
medical bills had consumed the family savings and forced [me] to sell
[our] home and funiture.... I filed a bankruptcy. To me, in the
working class we were always taught you work; you earn your pay.... I
felt very degraded. Not only had I lost a husband, I lost everything
he'd worked for all of his life.
Id.
65. "Continental developed and used the LAP specifically intending to in-
terfere with their employee's benefit plans." McLendon v. Continental Can
Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. See infra Part III.B (discussing the use of "smoking gun" evidence by
plaintiffs).
67. McLendon, 908 F.2d at 1179 n.15.
68. See Bruce McLanahan, Special Problems in the ERISA "Fringe" Ar-
eas, in 410 PLITLJT. 153, 159 (1991) (noting that "[w]hile the potential for li-
ability is more remote, attorneys should be aware of the possible applications
of ERISA Section 510 to plant closings").
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seemingly makes it illegal for anyone to discharge a partici-
pant in a pension plan with the intention of interfering with
that participant's pension benefits.69  Such a reading of the
statute creates a cause of action for virtually all employees who
lose their jobs in a plant closing situation 0 if they can prove
their employer closed the plant for the "purpose" of preventing
the attainment of pension benefits."1 Some courts have found
Until the last year or so, this innocuous provision, which was estab-
lished prior to the erosion of the at-will doctrine... had not been the
subject of much litigation. Recently, however, this Section has be-
come the focus of "big-stakes" class-type litigation in which courts
have expanded the section's protection well beyond its original pur-
pose and intended scope to the point where employers are "at-risk"
whenever they consider and undertake essential and legitimate busi-
ness decisions.
Charles S. Mishkind, Protected Rights Under Section 510 of ERISA: Avoiding
"Something For Nothing," C583 ALI-ABA 425, 427 (February 21, 1991).
69. See ERISA § 510. "[Kleep in mind that a literal reading of § 510
might make it unlawful to discharge anyone. After all, one of your purposes
in discharging a person is so that you do not have to keep paying his compen-
sation (including his benefit costs)." Cummings, supra note 25, at 91.
70. Mishkind writes:
In short, if Section 510 is read too expansively, so that employers
may not commit any conduct which interferes with the attainment of
benefits no matter how legitimate the business reason for that con-
duct, then every discharge, reduction-in-force, partial or complete
closing.., will violate Section 510 even if there is no evidence that
the motivating factor was the employer's specific intent to deny
benefit attainment and that the same result would have happened
even absent consideration of the proscribed criteria.
Misbkind, supra note 38, at 435.
71. The question of what constitutes "purpose" within the context of § 510
is being continually litigated in the courts. It is the intent of this Note to ad-
dress the on-going debate on the meaning of the term "purpose" and to pro-
pose a new formulation of the term that is consistent with the statute and
with surrounding business realities. In an age of increased mergers, "down-
sizing" and plant closings, the imposition of such extensive employer liability
could serve to stagnate particular economic endeavors.
In enacting Section 510, Congress did not intend to proscribe the
conduct of employers that seek to ensure their businesses' existence
by adopting "survival plans" (which may include plant closings...)
undertaken for legitimate business reasons typically within the ex-
ercise of business judgment, and not with the specific and dominant
intent of interfering with pension eligibility of individual employees.
Misbkind & Marshall, supra note 10, at 287; see, e.g., Aronson v. Servus Rub-
ber, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1984) (arguing that "[an overly literal interpre-
tation of this section would make illegal any partial termination, since such
terminations obviously interfere with the attainment of benefits by the termi-
nated group, and, indeed are expressly intended so to interfere. Such cannot
be the intent of the section."); Heath v. Massey-Ferguson Parts Co., 869 F.
Supp. 1379, 1385 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that a literal reading of the statute
"would thus greatly restrict an employer's ability to alter or reduce his future
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the companies that used pension benefits as a main factor in
making a plant closing decision liable to their laid off employ-
ees.
72
In plant closing cases brought under § 510, plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant intended to interfere with the vesting
of pension benefits.73 In addressing the issue of intent, courts
have applied varying standards. Some courts have held that
the plaintiff must prove specific discriminatory intent to pre-
vail in a plant closing case brought under § 510.74 Such courts
benefit obligations so as to address the changing economic realities unique to
each employer"); Gerald F. Seib, Is Big Bad? The Disgruntled Say That It Is,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1995, at A18 (discussing trends in politics and business
surrounding the summer's large corporate mergers); G. Pascal Zachary, Lay-
off Announcements Increased 39% in August as Merger Activity Picked Up,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1995, at A2 (discussing the increasing number of lay-offs
and providing predictions for the future). But see Gavalik v. Continental Can
Co., 812 F.2d 834, 857 n.39 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that "section 510's es-
sential purpose is to prevent employers from intentionally interfering with
impending pension liability whether motivated by malice toward the particu-
lar employee(s) or by a general concern for the economic stability of the com-
pany").
72. See Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1538 (C.D. Utah 1992)
(demonstrating the paradigm facts necessary to hold an employer liable under
§ 510). But see Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 980 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding no employer liability).
73. ERISA § 510.
74. See Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 550-51 (7th Cir.
1994) (affirming a summary judgment for the defendant on a § 510 claim).
The court found:
A plaintiff seeking relief under § 510 must establish that the com-
plained of action affecting his employment situation was taken by his
employer with the specific intent of interfering with his benefit
rights.... That is, the plaintiff must ultimately show that a desire to
frustrate his attainment or enjoyment of benefit rights contributed
toward the employer's decision and can avoid summary judgment
only if the materials properly before the district court, construed
sympathetically allow for such a conclusion.
Id. at 550. In Unida, the court found:
In an era when benefits costs are ever increasing, if mere evidence of
company-wide cost increases in ERISA benefits supported an infer-
ence that a plant was closed with specific intent to violate ERISA,
every plant closure could be challenged under ERISA section 510,
and such claims would be immune to summary judgment.
Unida, 986 F.2d at 980; see also Clark v. Coates & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217,
1222 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[tlhe ultimate inquiry in a § 510 case is
whether the employer had the specific intent to interfere with the employee's
ERISA rights"); Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (explaining that "[nlo ERISA cause of action lies where the loss of pen-
sion benefits was a mere consequence of, but not a motivating factor behind, a
termination of employment"). For a further examination of the issue of spe-
cific intent in a § 510 case, see Roger C. Siske, et. al., What's New in Employee
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view general corporate policy or allegations of non-specific ac-
tions as speculative and falling short of fulfilling the require-
ment of specific intent 5  The specific intent requirement
places a greater burden on plaintiffs to procure specific de-
tailed information to survive a summary judgment motion by a
§ 510 defendant.
Other courts have accepted a more relaxed showing of in-
tent on the part of the plaintiff. 6 In Nemeth v. Clark Equip-
ment Co., 77 the court held that in order to prevail on a § 510
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant terminated
the employee with a specific intent to violate ERISA.7 8 Yet, the
court also stated that the "[plaintiffs need not prove that de-
fendant's desire to interfere with their pension benefits was the
sole reason for their termination.7 9 Under this formulation of
intent, plaintiffs can establish intent if they can prove that the
accrual of pension benefits was but one of several reasons for
their termination 0
Benefits-A Summary of Current Cases and Other Developments, C991 ALI-
ABA 1, 123 (March 22, 1995).
75. See Unida, 986 F.2d at 980 (explaining that evidence of rising costs in
an era of ever increasing benefit costs and plant closings does not fulfill the
intent requirement of § 510).
76. See, e.g., Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (describing how "[pllaintiffs need not prove that defendant's de-
sire to interfere with their pension benefits was the sole reason for their ter-
mination"); McLanahan, supra note 68, at 159 (attempting to find a common
theme in Continental Can and McLendon). McLanahan writes, "It is difficult
to draw broad conclusions from the holdings of these cases other than to note
that they establish the Third Circuit among the Circuits clearly not requiring
an 'evil intent' to find a violation of ERISA Section 510." Id.
77. Nemeth, 677 F. Supp. at 903.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (requiring proof of accrual of pension benefits as one of several fac-
tors, as opposed to the sole reason, for termination). The Nemeth court cites
Continental Can for the proposition that "toince the plaintiffs establish that
the desire to avoid pension liability was a determining factor in the decision to
terminate their employment, the defendant, in order to avoid liability, must
prove, that it would have... engaged in the same conduct in any event." Id.
(citing Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir. 1987)). The
Nemeth court's use of such a standard mirrors the Title VII standard applied
in cases involving direct evidence of intent prior to the enactment of the 1991
Civil Rights Amendments. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing Title VII proof
models prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Amendments).
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1. A Tale of Two Cases
The issue of liability becomes more tenuous when the com-
pany considered pension benefits as only one of many factors
involved in a plant closing decision.81 Two of the major cases in
§ 510 mixed motive plant closings reached very different re-
sults. In Pickering v. USX Corp.,82 a federal district court in
Utah found USX's plant closing violated § 510.83 This case in-
volved a restructuring plan that called for the permanent
81. See, e.g., Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that "[slection 510 ... does not protect employees against all
employer actions undertaken with an eye toward thwarting the attainment of
benefits; only changes in one's employment status cannot stem from benefit
based motivations"); Hendricks v. Edgewater Steel Co., 898 F.2d 385, 389-90(3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to "turn [a] company's decision to lay off employees
during economic difficulties into an intention to violate ERISA"); Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1117-18 (2d Cir. 1988) (granting
summary judgment for the defendant employer because the employer success-
fully articulated a non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff employee's dis-
charge); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding no § 510
violation); Continental Can, 812 F.2d at 865 (finding "Continental's liability
avoidance scheme constituted a violation of ERISA when, pursuant to that
scheme, individual class members... were designated as permanently laid off
for the purpose of defeating their pension eligibility"); Aronson v. Servus Rub-
ber, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that § 510 applies to discrimina-
tory conduct directed at individuals and not to actions involving the pension
plan); Colizza v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 86-561, 1989 WL 407241, at *14 (W.D.
Pa. March 29, 1989) (noting that in any reduction in force "a number of em-
ployees are bound to fall just short of the line to qualify for enhanced benefits.
... [N]o ERISA cause of action lies where the loss of pension benefits was a
mere consequence of, but not a motivating factor behind termination of em-
ployment"); Nemeth v. Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 910-11 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (ruling in favor of defendant employer in a § 510 case involving a
plant closing).
82. 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1540 (C.D. Utah 1992). The Pickering court, in a
case dealing with direct evidence of a "liability avoidance program," adopted a
burden-shifting mechanism that resembles that of McDonnell Douglas. Id.;
see infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing the McDonnell
Douglas burden of proof mechanism). The Pickering court found that the
plaintiffs established a prima facie case for a § 510 violation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1536. The court found that
the burden of production then shifts to the defendants. Id. The defendants
articulated legitimate business reasons for USX's actions. Id. The court
found all of these proffered reasons to be pretextual and held USX liable un-
der § 510. Id. at 1538. The judicial standard applicable in cases involving di-
rect evidence of impermissible motivation is that found in Price Waterhouse.
See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (discussing the Price Water-
house burden of proof standard). For a further discussion of issues raised by
the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, passed after the Price Water-
house decision, see infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
83. Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1540.
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shutdown of several plant facilities. 84 In determining whether
to shutdown the plant at the center of this litigation, the com-
pany prepared a study in June 1985 entitled the "Employee
Benefit Costs Potential Shutdown of Geneva Plant."85 In
August 1986, after failing to reach a labor agreement with the
union, a work stoppage ensued at Geneva. 86 In January 1987,
the Corporate Policy Committee of USX authorized the
"indefinite idling" of the Geneva plant.17 Despite the fact that
the court found legitimate non-discriminatory reasons88 for the
non-recall of employees, the court found USX liable under §
510 for basing its decisions not to recall employees on pension
benefits.89
In the second case, Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co.,90 the Fifth
Circuit reached a different conclusion. In 1989, Levi Strauss
experienced a downturn in the sale of its 'Dockers" pants, pro-
duced at a San Antonio plant.91 Levi Strauss examined the
cost of producing the pants at its various locations and decided
to close the San Antonio plant.92 Terminated workers filed suit,
alleging violation of § 510.93
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment for the company.94 The court soundly re-
jected the plaintiffs' arguments that they need not show spe-
cific intent95 to violate ERISA, and that a general inference
96 of
84. Id. at 1517.
85. Id. at 1520. While this study was conducted in June 1985, a second
study was completed in November 1985. Id. Both studies estimated the
"employee-related costs if Geneva were shut down in 1989" as $169,056,000.
Id. "An expert for plaintiffs testified that, based on the June and November
studies, USXCs increased shutdown liability in 1989 as compared to 1986,
would be an additional $50 million." Id. at 1521.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1522.
88. Id. at 1537.
89. Id. at 1538. The Geneva plant manager "expressly testified that he
did not base his recall decisions on benefit eligibility." Id. at 1540. The court,
while acknowledging this testimony, found that the "direct evidence of a cor-
porate-wide policy to avoid recalls ... in order to avoid triggering benefits"
outweighed the evidence given by the manager. Id.
90. Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 981 (5th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 972.
92. Id. at 973.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 981.
95. Id. at 979-80.
96. The plaintiffs claimed this inference could be drawn despite diredt
testimony to the contrary. See id. at 980. The court quotes Larry Thigpen,
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a § 510 violation had been established.97 Instead, the court
found the plaintiffs evidence too general and speculative to de-
feat a summary judgment motion.98
D. TITLE VII JUDICIAL MODELS AND MIXED MOTIVES IN PLANT
CLOSING CASES
Judicial interpretation and legislative changes99 to Title
VII call into question the continued viability of using a Title
VII proof model to establish the element of employer intent. °°
Legislative and judicial refinement of the appropriate Title VII
proof models brings uncertainty to the appropriate burdens of §
510 plaintiffs and defendants.
1. Pre-1991 Title VII
Courts faced with mixed motive § 510 claims have adopted
Title VIPI as a model for analyzing employer intent.10 2 Like
the ultimate decision maker in the closing of the San Antonio plant, as testify-
ing that his "decision to close the San Antonio plant was made without regard
to costs associated with pension, workers' compensation, or other employee
benefits." Id. Despite this testimony, the plaintiffs argued that (1) the plant
had been closed to "cut costs"; (2) Levi Strauss continued to expand in an op-
eration in the Caribbean where it would not "incur pension" expenses; (3) Levi
Strauss management was aware of the rising employee benefit costs; and (4)
the San Antonio plant closure prevented 369 employees at the plant with less
than five years of service from vesting in their pension benefits. Id. This evi-
dence, according to the plaintiffs, was sufficient to raise an inference of a §
510 violation and to defeat a summary judgment motion. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs bad "pointed to no evidence
suggesting that Levi Strauss closed the San Antonio plant because of high
pension and benefit costs at that plant." Id.
99. For a discussion of the burden-shifting mechanism applied in Title VII
cases, see Darlene D. Bullock, Casenote, The Order and Allocation of Proof in
Mixed-Motive Discrimination Cases: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 2 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 117, 117-25 (1991). For a discussion of the judicial
and legislative changes to Title VII, see infra Part I.D.2.
100. See infra Part I.D.3 (discussing the impact of changes in Title VII on §
510 jurisprudence).
101. Title VII § 703(m), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, deals
specifically with mixed motive cases brought under Title VII. Section 703(m)
states: "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(m), amended by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
102. For examples of judicial use of the Title VII proof model in § 510
cases, see Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir. 1987);
Colizza v. United States Steel Corp., No. 86-561, 1989 WL 407241, at *10
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ERISA, Title VII is a worker protection statute, enacted to
provide a judicial remedy for victims of employment discrimi-
nation."3 Under Title VII, an employer who makes an em-
ployee hiring, firing, or classification decision on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex'0 4 faces liability.
10 5
In Title VII adjudication, the type of evidence available to
the plaintiff on the issue of the defendant's intent determines
the appropriate proof model. The proof model when direct evi-
dence of intent is available differs from the proof model im-
posed on cases proven by circumstantial evidence.
10 6
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1989); Nemeth v. Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899,
903 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
103. Section 703 of Title VII defines "unlawful employment practice" as
follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
104. Id.
105. Title VII provides limited exemptions from liability for religious or-
ganizations. Id. § 2000e-1(a).
106. Under Title VII, the Supreme Court established two proof models to
be used in mixed motive cases. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 258 (1989) (outlining the direct evidence test); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (outlining the circumstantial evidence
test). Courts applying § 510 have adopted these models. See, e.g., Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 860 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying the circum-
stantial evidence proof model). If a plaintiff has direct evidence of the em-
ployer's impermissible motivation, the court will apply the Price Waterhouse
formulation. The Supreme Court held:
[Wjhen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid
a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiffs gender into account.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. Title VII was amended in 1991 to respond
to Price Waterhouse. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1994). The 1991 Amend-
ments further provide that if the plaintiff makes a successful showing of em-
ployer liability under § 703(m) and the employer demonstrates that the same
action would have been taken in the absence of the impermissible motive, the
plaintiff can only claim injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs. Id. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B). In such a situation, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to damages or




When direct evidence of an employer's impermissible moti-
vation does not exist, courts use a proof model initially espoused
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.107 The McDonnell Douglas
test requires a Title VII plaintiff to show membership in a pro-
tected class, application and qualification for an open employ-
ment position with the defendant, plaintiffs rejection from the
position, and the employer's continued search for an individual
with the plaintiffs qualifications to fill the position. °8 As re-
fined by subsequent decisions,10 9 the establishment of a prima
If a plaintiff only has circumstantial evidence of the employer's impermissi-
ble motivation, the court should apply the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks
model. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas established the proof
model that would be applied to mixed motive situations in which the plaintiff
could only establish circumstantial evidence of the impermissible motivation.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. The Court held:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden un-
der the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.... The burden then must
shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection .... [The employee] must ... be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that... stated reason ... was in
fact pretext.
Id.
The Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas was further modified by the
Court's subsequent holdings in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993). The Court in Burdine held that once a plaintiff es-
tablishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to
the defendant "to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evi-
dence that the plaintiff was rejected ... for a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The defendant need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. Id. Further, it
is the plaintiff who holds the ultimate burden of persuasion to convince the
factfinder that the "proffered reason was not the true reason for the employ-
ment decision." Id. at 256. In Hicks, the Supreme Court further defined the
proof model in circumstantial evidence mixed motives cases. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
at 2756. The Court held that just because the "employers reason is unper-
suasive, or even obviously contrived" that "does not necessarily establish that
the plaintiffs proffered reason of race is correct. That remains a question for
the factfinder to answer." Id.
107. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
108. Id. at 802.
109. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (refining the requirements for estab-
lishment of a prima facie case). For a further discussion of the continual re-
finement of the circumstantial evidence test, see infra notes 124-130 and ac-
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facie case under the McDonnell Douglas test simply requires a
plaintiff to produce circumstantial evidence.1 ° Once the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate reason for the em-
ployment decision, under the Supreme Court decision in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.'I1
In Title VII cases in which direct evidence of an imper-
missible motivation does exist as one of many possible motiva-
tions for the employment decision (the paradigm mixed motive
situation), courts employ the test set forth in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins."2 Under Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff must es-
tablish that "an impermissible motive played a motivating part
in an adverse employment decision."' Once established, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that it "would have made the same deci-
sion in the absence of the unlawful motive." 114
2. Post-1991 Title VII
Both Congress and the courts have considered Title VII is-
sues in the years following the establishment of the circum-
stantial and direct evidence models. In 1991, Congress reacted
to the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse by passing the 1991
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'" Likewise, in
1993, the Supreme Court refined the circumstantial evidence
model in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.116
The amended Title VII provides that once plaintiffs estab-
lish the use of an impermissible motivation, they have estab-
lished an "unlawful employment practice.""' Even if the de-
fendants can establish that the decision would have been made
without taking the impermissible classification into considera-
companying text. This circumstantial evidence model will be referred to in
the text as the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks model.
110. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
111. 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
112. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (outlining
the proof model that should be applied in mixed motive employment discrimi-
nation cases where there is direct evidence of discriminatory intent). This
decision has been partially overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See
infra notes 115-118 (discussing the changes made to Title VII by the 1991
amendments).
113. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249.
114. Id. at 250.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
116. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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tion, they still face liability under Title VII."18 The liability
faced by the defendants in these cases is limited to injunctive
relief, attorney's fees and costs.
For its part, the Supreme Court refined the burden-
shifting mechanism of McDonnell Douglas in Hicks.119 The
Court held that even if the factfinder in a circumstantial evi-
dence case rejects the defendant's proffered reasons, a finding
for the plaintiff is not mandated. 2 ° The factfinder must de-
termine that the employer's decision was based upon the
plaintiffs membership in a protected group.12 1
3. Application of Title VII Proof Models to Section 510 Plant
Closing Cases
The application of Title VII proof models to § 510 cases in-
volves the judicial acceptance of circumstantial evidence to es-
tablish a violation, and the further application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to § 510 mixed motive cases. If circumstan-
tial evidence of a § 510 violation is permitted, then the court,
following the Title VII proof model, will apply a different evi-
dentiary burden upon both the plaintiff and the defendant. 22
Likewise, if direct evidence of intent is proffered by the plain-
tiff, as is the case in a traditional mixed motive scenario, the
court will impose the post-1991 Civil Rights Amendments bur-
den-shifting mechanism 23
a. Judicial Acceptance of Circumstantial Evidence in Title VII
Obtaining direct evidence that an employer specifically in-
tended to close a plant for the purpose of interfering with its
employees' pension benefits is difficult.12 1 Most plaintiffs do
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994). The statute provides that once an
individual proves a violation under the mixed motive section, if the defen-
dants can prove it would have made the decision anyway, the court may grant
declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs. Id. The court may
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment. Id.
119. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing circum-
stantial evidence proof models).
123. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (discussing direct
evidence proof models).
124. See Bass v. Retirement Plan of Conoco, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 735, 746
(W.D. La. 1988) ("The plaintiffs cannot seriously suggest, and nothing in the
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not possess the proverbial "smoking gun" with which they can
establish that the company intentionally interfered with the
vesting of pension benefits. 125 Under a Title VII analysis, when
no direct evidence of intent exists, this showing of intent can be
demonstrated through circumstantial evidence.
12 6
The judicial acceptance of a proof model based upon cir-
cumstantial evidence in a § 510 claim dispenses with any re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove actual purpose or, more
simply, a direct causal link between the interference with the
employee's pension benefits and the adverse employment deci-
sion. A plaintiff instead need only satisfy the requirements of
McDonnell Douglas127 to shift the burden of proof to the em-
ployer.
Due to the lack of direct evidence of intent, adjudication of
mixed motive plant closing cases under § 510 often involves the
application of the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial proof
model. 2 8 In Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., the Third Circuit
set forth the essential elements of a § 510 claim based on cir-
cumstantial evidence. 1
29
record gives the least indication, that Conoco entered this six hundred million
dollar sale of assets for the purpose of preventing the plaintiffs from receiving
[early retirement opportunity].").
125. See Colizza v. United States Steel Corp., No. 86-561, 1989 WL 407241,
at *10 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that cases in which direct evidence is present
are rare).
126. See Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987) ("In
most cases, however, specific intent to discriminate will not be demonstrated
by 'smoking gun' evidence. As a result, the evidentiary burden in discrimina-
tion cases may also be satisfied by the introduction of circumstantial evi-
dence.").
127. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)
(establishing prima facie case for circumstantial evidence).
128. See Continental Can, 812 F.2d at 852 (adopting the McDonnell Doug-
las test for § 510 claims); see also Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501,
1532 (C.D. Utah 1992) (noting that in deciding cases under § 510 courts apply
the rules for analyzing discrimination claims developed under Title VII, and
citing Continental Can as the appropriate test where no specific employer in-
tent has been established); Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 903
(W.D. Mich. 1987) (following the proof model established in Continental Can).
129. Continental Can, 812 F.2d at 852. Such a test does not strictly adhere
to the McDonnell Douglas framework. See supra notes 107-111 (discussing
the McDonnell Douglas proof model); see also Colizza, 1989 WL 407241, at *10
(describing the prima facie case). The Colizza court described the prima facie
test as requiring a plaintiff to establish some prohibited employer conduct,
taken for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
the employee may become entitled. Id. Once plaintiff satisfies these re-
quirements, the employer "must articulate-but not prove-a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the layoff of plaintiffs." Id. at *13; see also JOEL
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The Gavalik court altered the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting mechanism to "fit" into the context of plant closings.
The court held that a plaintiffs prima facie case under § 510
must include: "(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the
purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to
which the employee may become entitled."'30
b. Mixed Motives and the 1991 Amendments
The 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the
1991 Amendments) throw a wrench into both the circumstan-
tial evidence and direct evidence tests. Prior to the 1991
Amendments, if the employee possesses "smoking gun" direct
evidence, she can avail herself of the Price Waterhouse131 direct
evidence test which permits an employer the opportunity to
articulate a legitimate reason for the dismissal. After the 1991
Amendments, the use of the direct evidence test has resulted in
almost certain employer liability where an impermissible moti-
vation is established.'32 The establishment of liability, how-
ever, remains uncertain as courts continue to disagree on the
requisite level of intent. 133
W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRiMiNATION 927-28 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the
McDonnell Douglas standard for a prima facie case). Friedman and Strickler
point out:
[W]here a plaintiff alleges that she was chosen to be the victim of a
reduction-in-force or other form of structural reorganization, it often
would be impossible to satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case standard, i.e., that after her rejection, the
position remained open and that the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of the plaintiffs qualifications. By definition,
most victims are not replaced in reduction-in-force cases.... Reduc-
tion-in-force cases also raise an interesting question concerning the
second part of the McDonnell Douglas formula-i.e., that the plaintiff
was qualified and performing satisfactorily. Now that the plaintiff
has been discharged and her position no longer exists, how does she
prove she is qualified? Qualified for what? Her nonexistent position?
Id. But see Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1241 (8th
Cir. 1991) ("Although the four criteria set forth in McDonnell Douglas provide
one way of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the
proof necessary will vary according to the circumstances of the case.").
130. Continental Can, 812 F.2d at 852.
131. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (providing
the test for a direct evidence analysis).
132. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see supra notes 115-
118 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the Continental Can court's formulation of the




Once an employee establishes a prima facie case resulting
in liability, the employer can limit its liability by showing that
it would have made the same decision despite the impermissi-
ble factor.'34 The employee is then only entitled to injunctive
relief, attorney's fees, and costs.135 Even with this limitation on
available remedies, such injunctive relief could plausibly pro-
hibit the closing of an ailing plant and could dramatically im-
pact a corporation's business judgment, as well as its economic
well-being.
Even if a plant's potential pay-out in pension benefits is
only a collateral matter in the decision to close a plant and
terminate employees,'36 the company could still be held liable
under § 510 under the 1991 Amendments. The finding of li-
ability would not differ despite the fact that the decision to
close the plant would have been made without the considera-
tion of pension benefits. 137
II. LEGAL AND PRAGMATIC CONCERNS ASSOCIATED
WITH EXTENSIVE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 510
Corporate liability under § 510 raises both legal and
pragmatic concerns. On a threshold level, questions arise re-
garding the ultimate applicability of § 510 to plant closing
situations. 138 Once the court decides that § 510 applies, further
questions surround the application of Title VII proof models to
establish corporate liability. 139
134. The Court in Price Waterhouse found:
[A]n employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely
showing that at the time of the decision it was motivated only in part
by a legitimate reason. The very premise of a mixed motives case is
that a legitimate reason was present.... Price Waterhouse already
has made this showing.... The employer instead must show that its
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the
same decision.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
135. See supra note 118 (discussing possible employer liability).
136. For a prior case dealing with this issue, see Clark v. Coats & Clark,
Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 1990).
137. For a prior case dealing with this issue, see Nemeth v. Clark Equip-
ment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 909 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
138. See infra Part flA.
139. See infra Part lI.B.
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A. THE POSSIBLE MISAPPLICATION OF SECTION 510 TO PLANT
CLOSINGS
Courts have applied § 510 to plant closings without con-
sidering certain threshold concerns, such as the propriety of
using a class-based approach, the type of employer intent re-
quired to establish liability, and the potential for absurd re-
sults in individual cases.
The first threshold issue involves the applicability of the
statute to a class of individuals. Under a purely textualist ap-
proach to § 510,140 the statute only applies to cases in which an
individual is discharged for the purpose of interfering with his
or her pension benefits.141 Only a few courts, however, have
addressed the issue surrounding whether § 510 applies to
groups or to individuals. Most courts, without addressing the
issue, make blanket assumptions' that § 510 applies to both
individuals and class action suits. 4 3 Other courts that have
140. At least one court has acknowledged the absurdity of applying a
purely textualist approach to § 510. See Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F.
Supp. 694, 723 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (finding it unlikely that § 510 was intended to
outlaw the termination of all contingent future liabilities).
141. Recall that § 510 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to dis-
charge... a participant or beneficiary... or for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become enti-
tled under the plan ...." ERISA § 510. The factfnder could plausibly find
that the statute was only intended to cover cases of individuals who were dis-
charged for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of pension benefits.
In a suit brought under both the ADEA and ERISA § 510, the Supreme Court
clarified its holding, stating that the court did not "mean to suggest that an
employer lawfully could fire an employee in order to prevent his pension
benefits from vesting. Such conduct is actionable under § 510 of ERISA."
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993). This wording may in-
timate that the Court will accept the claim of an individual § 510 claimant, a
finding consistent with the legislative history of ERISA. The Committee on
Education and Labor reported that the primary purpose of ERISA "is the pro-
tection of individual pension rights." H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639.
142. See McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1181-82 (3d Cir.
1990) (discussing liability both at the "class" and "individual level"); Gavalik v.
Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing both indi-
vidual and class action context under § 510).
143. See Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 907 (W.D. Mich.
1987). The Nemeth court found:
Class-based discrimination, whether based on race, sex or, under
ERISA, pension rights, is every bit as illegal as individualized dis-
crimination.... ERISA does not distinguish between the termination
of one employee and the termination of 100 employees. Either action
is illegal if taken with the purpose of avoiding pension liability.
[Vol. 81:735760
ERISA SECTION 510
specifically addressed the issue have held that § 510 can only
apply to action directed toward individual employees. 1"
The second question surrounds the issue of intent. Courts
require that plaintiffs establish intent in their prima facie
case. 4 5 Such intent can be established through either the di-
rect evidence or the circumstantial evidence Title VII judicial
models.'46 Intent to "interfere" with pension benefits can be es-
tablished by the plaintiff by proffering evidence that pension
benefits played a role in the decision to close the plant. 47 In
applying Title VII proof models to § 510 cases, courts have dif-
fered in the role that they will allow pension benefits to play in
the ultimate plant closing decision. Some courts have held
that the plaintiffs need only prove that pension benefits were a
"determinative factor" in the business decision. 48 In determin-
144. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1224-29 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Clark court looked at the unique situations of each individual plaintiff to
determine if the employer's action was "directed at ERISA rights in particu-
lar." Id. at 1224. Another court stated that "It]he purpose of [§ 510] is to pre-
vent discharge or constructive discharge of specific employees to prevent their
pension rights from vesting." Bass v. Retirement Plan of Conoco, Inc., 676 F.
Supp. 735, 746 (W.D. La. 1988) (emphasis added); see also West v. Butler, 621
F.2d 240, 246 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that § 510 is aimed solely at protecting
individual rights); Moehle v. NL Industries, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 769, 779 n.6
(E.D. Mo. 1986) (noting that § 510 only prohibits action aimed at individuals).
145. For statement of plaintiffs prima facie case, see supra note 129.
146. See Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851-52 (3d Cir.
1987).
147. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text (discussing appropri-
ate proof models).
148. See Continental Can, 812 F.2d at 860 ("[Section] 510 of ERISA re-
quires no more than proof that the desire to defeat pension eligibility is "a de-
terminative factor" in the challenged conduct."); Nemeth, 677 F. Supp. at 903
("Plaintiffs need not prove that defendant's desire to interfere with their pen-
sion benefits was the sole reason for their termination."). The Nemeth court
employed a "determinative factor" test which the court adopted from Conti-
nental Can. Id. This test requires that the plaintiff establish that the "desire
to avoid pension liability was a determining factor in the decision to terminate
their employment." Id. For the defendant to avoid liability upon a successful
showing by the plaintiff, the defendant must prove that the same outcome
would have occurred regardless of the impermissible motive. Id. If the de-
fendant carries the burden on this point, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate pretext. Id.
This formulation of a mixed motive proof model lacks any semblance of
the McDonnell Douglas model. In the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks
formulation, the defendant need only offer a non-discriminatory motive for the
employment decision. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
"The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to argue (not
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ing whether the pension benefits constituted a "determinative
factor" in the plant closing decision, courts have made conflict-
ing decisions based solely upon their discretionary powers.
1 49
The third issue involves the need to look for rationality in
result. The continued expansion of § 510 into plant closing
cases will invariably lead to absurd results because decisions to
close plants always contain some calculation of pension bene-
fits to ascertain the "true liabilities" of a particular plant.150
True, the managers are motivated "in part" by the rising cost of
"demonstrate") pretext. The ultimate decision remains with the factfinder as
to whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant's proffered reason was
pretextual and that the defendant actually acted with a discriminatory moti-
vation. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 501 (1993) (finding that
once the defendant successfully carries his/her burden of production any pre-
sumption raised through plaintiffs establishment of a prima facie case "drops
out of the picture"). The Hicks Court also states that it has "no authority to
impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory employment
practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines... that the employer
has unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 515.
After applying its "pro-plaintiff' test, the Nemeth court did not find liabil-
ity on the part of the employer. The court held that "[wihile termination of
employees in order to reduce labor costs is not always illegal, ERISA prohibits
such actions if the primary reason for high labor costs is pension liability."
Nemeth, 677 F. Supp. at 907. The Nemeth court found that the employer
would have made the decision even if it had ignored the cost of the pension
plan altogether. Id. at 909. The court stated that
[The employer] sustained its burden of proving an alternative, non-
discriminatory reason for its action. [The employer] would have
made the same decision, even if it had factored pension benefits out
of the study entirely, because the evidence showed that [the em-
ployer] was looking for the least costly alternative [between the two
plants].
Id. at 910.
149. See Moehle v. NIL Industries, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 769, 779 n.6 (E.D. Mo.
1986). The court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to use § 510 as a mechanism
for liability. The court found:
Firstly, plaintiffs were vested[,] and [§ 510] is designed to prevent
employers from discharging employees in order to prevent vesting.
Secondly, plaintiffs cannot make a good faith allegation that the clo-
sure of the St. Louis plant and the termination of plaintiffs were done
"for the purpose of interfering with [plaintiffs] attainment of" bene-
fits. The closure and termination had readily apparent business jus-
tifications. Thirdly, [§ 510] only prohibits action aimed at individu-
als. The decision to close a plant is not a [§ 510] violation, even
though it necessarily interferes with the terminated employees' at-
tainment of benefits, so long as the plant closure had business justifi-
cation.
Id.
150. See Cummings, supra note 25, at 92 ("[it strikes me a fundamental
mistake to force a business to operate with blinders on, to force a company to




potential pension payouts, but the pension benefits are not of-
ten the determinative factor in deciding to close the plant.
They are only one of many factors, calculated to obtain the
"bottom line," considered in the ultimate decision.
The imposition of a judicial rule that imposes extensive li-
ability upon corporations negates the original two-pronged
legislative purpose of providing regulation to private pension
plans and encouraging their continued growth.151 Corporations
are effectively placed in a "Catch-22" position: in exercising
sound business judgment,152 corporations must take all possi-
ble expenses into consideration when calculating the "bottom
line" of their business.153 But a company cannot close a plant
151. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4639-40. The House of Representatives Report states that the "primary
purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the
committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private
retirement plans." Id. The Report further states that
[ERISA] is designed to: (1) establish equitable standards of plan ad-
ministration; (2) mandate minimum standards of plan design with
respect to the vesting of plan benefits; (3) require minimum stan-
dards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the amortization of un-
funded liabilities; (4) insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities
against the risk of premature plan termination; and (5) promote a re-
newed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the num-
ber of participants receiving private retirement benefits.
Id. For the primary purpose of ERISA to coexist with the fifth enumerated
goal, employers cannot be held to a standard which imposes virtually strict
liability. If held to such a standard, the primary purpose may be achieved,
but the knowledge of extensive liability would not encourage employers to de-
velop private pension plans. See also Mishkind, supra note 38, at 432:
In enacting Section 510, Congress did not intend to proscribe the
conduct of employers that seek to ensure their businesses' existence
by adopting "survival plans" (which may include plant closings, re-
ductions-in-force, reorganizations, position consolidations) under-
taken for legitimate business reasons typically within the exercise of
business judgment, and not with the specific and dominant intent of
interfering with pension eligibility of individual employees.
Id.; see also Duane E. Thompson, et. al., Age Discrimination in Reduction-In-
Force: The Metamorphosis of McDonnell Douglas Continues, 8 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 46, 66 (1986) ("Clearly employers can legally opt to reduce their work
force as a cost cutting device."). But see Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812
F.2d 834, 857 n.39 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that § 510's essential purpose is "to
prevent employers from intentionally interfering with impending pension eli-
gibility whether motivated by malice toward the particular employee(s) or by
a general concern for the economic stability of the company").
152. Langbein and Wolk ask rhetorically: "Do you think good managers
make [plant closing] decisions ignorant of such fundamentally relevant infor-




without affecting the ability of some employees to vest in their
pension benefits. Courts have acknowledged the fact that in
plant closing situations some pension benefits will always be
affected.'54
B. TITLE VII AND PLANT CLOSINGS-EXAMINING THE MODEL
The Title VII model has been applied in plant closing con-
texts without an evaluation of whether the model is appropri-
ate.155 An evaluation of the appropriateness of the Title VII
model is needed in light of the dramatic legislative changes
made to Title VII in 1991. Title VII now permits the finding of
liability in cases in which the plaintiff proves that the defen-
dants used an impermissible motive as one factor in making
the employment decision. 56 The plaintiff can establish an im-
permissible motivation through either direct or circumstantial
evidence, resulting in the defendant's liability despite the fact
that the defendant can prove that the action was also moti-
vated by legitimate factors. This has the effect of collapsing
the circumstantial and direct evidence analyses into one an-
other. The continued application of Title VII (as amended)
could inappropriately impose extensive liability upon corpora-
tions who decide to close plants.
153. For a discussion of the way in which one court dismissed the "bottom
line" argument, see Nemeth v. Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 905
(W.D. Mich. 1987). See also Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 857
n.39 (3d. Cir. 1987). For further discussion of the acceptance of a business
judgment defense, see Moehle v. NL Industries, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 769, 779 n.6
(E.D. Mo. 1986).
154. See Hendricks v. Edgewater Steel Co., 898 F.2d 385, 390 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that it could not "turn the company's decision to lay off employ-
ees during economic difficulties into an intention to violate ERISA"); Colizza
v. United States Steel Corp., No. 86-561, 1989 WL 407241, at *14 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (finding that "in any massive reduction in force situation, a number of
employees are bound to fall just short of the qine' to qualify for enhanced
benefits"); Moehle v. NL Industries, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 769, 779 n.6 (E.D. Mo.
1986) (holding that, where a plant closing and employee termination had
readily apparent business justifications, plaintiffs could not even make a good
faith allegation that employer was acting with the purpose of interfering with
plaintiffs' attainment of benefits).
155. The application of Title VII to § 510 claims could well be misplaced.
"Just as meanings are sometimes lost in the translation of expressions from
one language to another, the utility of formulae can be lost in their migration
across legal fields." Furcini v. Equibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (W.D.
Pa. 1987).




Despite questions raised about its ultimate applicability,
courts continue to impose corporate liability based on plaintiffs'
claims of § 510 violations in plant closing cases. Courts adjudi-
cating these cases also impose a Title VII proof burden on § 510
litigants, notwithstanding the difficulty of reconciling pre-1991
precedents with the 1991 Amendments." 7 Moreover, a mixed
motive plant closing raises issues beyond the scope of a Title
VII analysis, because the factfinder cannot look at how role-
differing motivations affected the ultimate decision.
I. A REASONED RESPONSE TO SECTION 510
AND TITLE VII
Superficially, both ERISA and Title VII were intended to
prohibit employment discrimination.15 However, the prohibi-
tions of the two statutes are not directed toward the same ani-
mus. 15 9 ERISA provides protection against economic discrimina-
tion, while Title VII provides protection against discrimination
based on race, religion, national origin and sex.160 Thus, Title
VII prohibits discrimination based upon immutable human
characteristics while ERISA prohibits discrimination based
upon economic standing.
If courts continue to utilize a Title VII approach in plant
closing cases, 161 the courts should fashion their analysis to fit
current Supreme Court precedent (as evidenced in the evolving
157. For a discussion of the burden-shifting mechanisms of McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse, see supra notes 107-114 and accompanying
text.
158. See supra notes 29 & 103 and accompanying text (discussing the in-
tent of the operative statutes).
159. Title VII condemns employment practices which serve to discriminate
against an individual "because of" his or her "race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The non-interference provision of Sec-
tion 510 makes it unlawful to "discharge" an individual "for the purpose of in-
terfering with the attainment of any right to which" the individual "may
become entitled." ERISA § 510. Thus, Title VII directs its prohibitions to-
ward the eradication of employment discrimination on the basis of immutable
characteristics and § 510 directs its prohibition against interference with eco-
nomic rights that an individual may be entitled to at some point in the future.
160. Jared A. Goldstein, Employment Discrimination Claims Under
ERISA Section 510: Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and Plan
Remedies?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 193, 195 (1994) (noting the types of discrimina-
tory conduct ERISA and Title VII seek to address).
161. The Supreme Court recently assumed for the purposes of argument,
but without ruling on the issue, that Title VII burdens of proof are applicable
to cases brought under the ADEA. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Cater-
ers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1308 (1996).
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McDonnell Douglas proof model) on Title VII adjudication. In
doing so, the courts would promote consistency in judgment
and provide a standard for corporations to use in implementing
plant closing decisions.
A. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REEXAMINED
In mixed motive cases of circumstantial evidence, the
courts should adopt a third prong to their current McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine proof model. 162 This third prong is embodied
in the Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.163 The Hicks prong would require a plaintiff to prove
that defendant's proffered reason for closing the plant is pre-
textual. 6
Courts should also not permit a mechanical application of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to plant closing cases.
The Supreme Court recently ruled that "the very name 'prima
facie case' suggests there must be at least a logical connection
between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal
discrimination for which it establishes" a rebuttable presump-
tion.' 6 In requiring such a "logical connection" between the
elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case and the employer's
motivation, the circumstantial evidence model appears to be
developing into a proof model which may offer some consis-
tency in § 510 cases. 66
B. ANOTHER LOOK AT THE "SMOKING GUN"
Cases involving direct evidence of employer intent simi-
larly create liability problems for employers. The issue facing
employers in these cases is when, if ever, can an employer take
pension costs into consideration when closing a facility. Could,
for example, a cost-benefit analysis which included pension
162. The current "two-pronged" approach stems from the McDonnell Doug-
las prima facie case combined with the Burdine/Hicks burden-shifting
mechanism. For further discussion of the McDonnell Douglas/BurdinelHicks
model, see supra notes 107-111 & 119 and accompanying text.
163. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993).
164. Id. at 508.
165. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1308.
166. It is difficult to rely on this ruling to provide a method of consistent
analysis in § 510 cases, because the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
expansion of Title VII proof models to § 510. The issue thus remains open for
development in the circuits. A piecemeal adaptation will only serve to exacer-
bate current problems associated with varying analyses under § 510.
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benefits as only one' 67 of many factors be considered the pro-
verbial "smoking gun" that would fix extensive liability on the
employer?
C. CONTINENTAL CAN (THE PARADIGM) AND PRICE
WATERHOUSE
Mixed motive cases involving direct evidence of intent,
such as Continental Can's "liability avoidance program," 168
provide a closer case for liability. Such a case brought under
the current text of § 510 should be examined under a Price Wa-
terhouse proof model. 69  Under this model, if the plaintiffs
prove through the use of direct evidence that pension benefits
played a "motivating part"170 in the plant closing decision, the
defendants can avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the same decision would have been made
without taking the impermissible factor into consideration. 171
The 1991 Civil Rights Act should not mandate liability upon
the finding of an impermissible motivation. Instead the defen-
dants should be given the opportunity to establish a permissi-
ble motivation.
D. THE CONSISTENT SOLUTION
Instead of facing uncertain liability under § 510, Congress
could allow companies to opt out'72 of pension programs 173 and
167. For a discussion of the use of pension benefits as one of many factors
in a plant closing decision, see supra Part I.D.3.b.
168. See McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1174-5 (3d Cir.
1990). For a further discussion of Continental Can's liability avoidance pro-
gram see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (outlining the Price
Waterhouse direct evidence test).
170. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
17L Id.
172. Companies with existing pension plans would conceivably be required
to adhere to the termination requirements of ERISA. Such action, to avoid
the uncertain liability problems arising under § 510 as addressed in this Note,
should not be initiated on the eve of a plant closing decision. Issues such as
whether a plan termination decision could be made on the eve of a plant clos-
ing decision, and plan termination generally, are beyond the scope of this
Note. For a complete discussion of pension plan terminations, see EDWARD
THOMAS VEAL & EDWARD R. MACKIEWICZ, PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS § 1.2
(1989).
173. The "pension plans" that employers would opt out of would be
"defined benefit plans." A defined benefit plan is a retirement plan that (1)
expresses the benefit as a certain amount to be paid at an employee's retire-
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instead promote the use of Individual Retirement Accounts 74
by their employees." 5 Companies could opt out of a pension
promise because pension plans are voluntary in nature.
7 6
While such a solution would provide a means of avoiding § 510
ment; (2) provides for the monthly payment of a certain sum for the life of the
retired employee; and (3) does not establish individual accounts for each par-
ticipating employee. Peter T. Scott, A National Retirement Income Policy, 44
TAX NOTES 913, 919-20 (1989). ERISA § 3(35) defines a "defined benefit plan"
as "a pension plan other than an individual account plan."
174. Individual Retirement Accounts are one example of a "defined contribu-
tion plan." ERISA § 3(34) defines a defined contribution plan as a "pension plan
which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits
based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account .... " The
number of defined contribution plans have been increasing over the past ten
to fifteen years. See Scott, supra note 173, at 919. One reason for the in-
crease in the number of defined contribution plans is that much of ERISA
does not apply to defined contribution plans, thus an employer is not sub-
jected to the strict ERISA regulations while still providing a retirement option
for its employees. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 20, at 44. This sentiment is
echoed by Clark and McDermed. They write: "The long-run trend away from
defined benefit plans, however, is consistent with the evolution of federal
pension regulation since 1974." ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. McDERMED, THE
CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN A CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 106
(1990).
175. LAWRENCE E. ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLITICS, AND
WORKERS 47 & n.71 (1986) (finding that the labor movement achieved partial
and fragile successes only in legislation providing minimum standards of pro-
tection for workers from loss of pension benefits under ERISA). The author
explains that the "fragility of these successes has become evident since 1982
with the... encouragement of businesses to opt out of pension programs alto-
gether by promoting the Individual Retirement Account .... " Id. An empiri-
cal study completed by Coopers & Lybrand explains the paradox. The study
states:
There is currently no law that requires an employer to offer employee
benefits other than those mandated under Worker's Compensation,
Social Security, unemployment insurance, and in some states, dis-
ability insurance. However, once an employer does offer a plan, that
plan becomes subject to many laws. At a minimum, employee benefit
plans are subject to the requirements of [ERISA].
COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P., CLOSING PLANTS: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING
STRATEGIES 37 (1986). If companies provide pension programs for their em-
ployees, they are subject to the requirements of ERISA. If companies do not
provide pension programs to their employees, they avoid ERISA.
176. Indeed, Congress recognized ERISA's limited scope precisely because
of the "voluntary nature of private retirement plans." H.R. REP. No. 93-533,
at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4639, 4639. The Committee on
Education and Labor noted that the bill "represents an effort to strike an ap-
propriate balance between the interests of employers and labor organizations
in maintaining flexibility in the design and operation of their pension pro-
grams, and the need of the workers for a level of protection which will ade-
quately protect their rights and just expectations." Id.; see also Mishkind, su-
pra note 38, at 429 ("ERISA protects only those benefits that an employer
voluntarily agrees to provide.").
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liability, it would also undermine the ultimate goals of ERISA,
because by opting out of the pension program a company can
opt out of ERISA regulation.' 7 However, this is one road for
companies to take when discussing the possibility of uncertain
ERISA liability.
Consistent application of § 510 in plant closing cases is
necessary to insure corporate profitability, employee security
and judicial efficiency. By adhering to pre-1991 Supreme
Court direct evidence proof models and adopting current Su-
preme Court analysis in cases involving circumstantial evi-
dence, courts faced with mixed motive cases under § 510 can
insure this consistency in adjudication and equity in result,
while achieving the purposes of ERISA.
CONCLUSION
Courts finding a valid cause of action under § 510 should
examine the totality of the plant closing situation. This exami-
nation would take into consideration not only the concerns of
the affected employees but also the legitimate business con-
cerns of the employer. The consistent application of post-1991
Supreme Court decisions in cases involving circumstantial evi-
dence, and pre-1991 Supreme Court decisions in cases involv-
ing direct evidence, would permit more equitable results.
Until Congress alters the absolutist language of the stat-
ute or the Supreme Court rules on the applicability of the Title
VII proof models, courts need to take a more pragmatic ap-
proach, examining not only the economic impact on employees,
but also the economic impact on the employer. Such a prag-
matic examination, coupled with the consistent application of
Title VII proof models, will insure that companies continue to
supply pension security for their employees, thus lessening the
uncertain liability faced by companies in making plant closing
177. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4849. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare found:
The enactment of progressive and effective pension legislation is also
certain to increase stability within the framework of our nation's
economy, since the tremendous resources and assets of the private
pension plan system are an integral party of our economy. It will
also serve to restore credibility and faith in the private pension plans
designed for American working men and women, and this should
serve to encourage rather than diminish efforts by management and
industry to expand pension plan coverage and to improve benefits for
workers.
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decisions and effectuating the pension promise embodied in
ERISA.
